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Introduction
Horizontal shareholding is common ownership in competing …rms. Such horizontal shareholding can induce a con ‡ict in the …rm-speci…c objectives of shareholders, wherein horizontal shareholders in any given …rm want that …rm to pursue a less competitive strategy than the strategy desired by non-horizontal shareholders. 1 Hence, …rm managers must weigh the con ‡icting objectives of di¤erent shareholders according to their relative in ‡uence over …rm decision-making.
Schmalz (2018) discusses the desirable properties for the weighting scheme used by managers: (i) absent horizontal shareholding, managers would maximize their …rm's own pro…t; (ii) with horizontal shareholding, managers would internalize the impact of their …rm's strategy on rival …rm pro…ts when their …rm's controlling shareholders have …nancial rights in the rival; (iii) the weight that managers assign to rival …rms would be continuous on the …nancial and control rights of the …rm's shareholders; (iv) managers would maximize industry pro…t when all controlling shareholders are fully diversi…ed across rivals; and (v) the weight that managers assign to rival …rm pro…ts would re ‡ect relatively more the interests of relatively large shareholders. Gramlich and Grundl (2017) , O'Brien and Waehrer (2017) and Crawford et al. (2018) discuss an additional property: (vi) the weight that managers assign to rival …rm pro…ts would not mimic the interests of horizontal shareholders when they own a share of the …rm that, even if non-horizontal shareholders are highly dispersed, does not induce full control.
The dominant formulation of the objective function of managers is due to O'Brien and Salop (2000, henceforth O&S) , who incorporating features from both Rotemberg (1984) and Bresnahan and Salop (1986) , assume the manager would decide the strategy of the …rm to maximize a control-weighted sum of the …rm's shareholders returns. Because those returns are a function of the pro…ts of the …rms in which shareholders hold …nancial rights, this implies that the manager of any …rm j would maximize a weighted sum of the pro…ts of (potentially) all the …rms in the industry: where and = denote the set of existing shareholders and …rms, respectively, x j denotes the strategy of …rm j, kj denotes the control rights of shareholder k in …rm j, R k = P g2= kg g 1 Although non-horizontal shareholders may favor a di¤erent …rm-speci…c strategy, that does not mean they are harmed by horizontal shareholding because horizontal shareholding also reduces the competitiveness of rival …rms, and non-horizontal shareholders bene…t from a mutual reduction of competition at both the …rm and its rivals. denotes the returns of shareholder k, kj denotes the …nancial rights of shareholder k in …rm j, and j denotes the operating pro…t of …rm j. Azar (2016 Azar ( , 2017 shows that this formulation can be microfounded through a probabilistic voting model in which shareholders elect one of two potential managers, which yields that the control rights of each shareholder will (a) if managers maximize their vote share, be proportional to their voting rights (proportional control) and (b) if managers maximize their odds of election, equal the odds that their vote will be pivotal in the election (i.e, by their Banzhaf (1965) power index). 2;3 However, some critique the dominant formulation for failing property (vi). 4 See Gramlich and Grundl (2017), O'Brien and Waehrer (2017) and Crawford et al. (2018) . In this paper, we propose an alternative formulation. In the lines of Azar (2016 Azar ( , 2017 and Brito et al. (2018) , we use a probabilistic voting model. But unlike prior literature, we assume that managers expect shareholders with higher …nancial stakes in their …rm will (for example) incur more e¤ort to become informed on the vote and thus could potentially have a larger preference for (or against) the challenger than other shareholders. Then, in equilibrium, the manager chooses the strategy of the …rm to maximize a control-weighted sum of the …rm's shareholders relative returns:
where j denotes the subset of shareholders who hold …nancial rights in …rm j,R k denotes the relative returns of shareholder k, normalized by her …nancial rights in …rm j. The intuition is as follows. The strategy proposals of the candidates impact the return of the …rm's shareholders, which in turn impacts their probability of voting for the candidates.
The assumption above implies that the latter impact is lower for shareholders with higher …nancial stakes since, having a larger preference for (or against) the challenger, they already have a larger probability of voting in one direction. As a consequence, candidates pay less attention to those shareholders than they would under the dominant formulation. They do so, by weighting not the absolute, but the relative returns of shareholders. 5 Our proposed alternative formulation is similar in nature to the formulation in Crawford 2 Azar (2017) also considers a probabilistic voting model in which shareholders vote either on whether to approve a manager-proposed change in the …rm's strategic plan. 3 Brito et al. (2018) generalize Azar (2016 Azar ( , 2017 's framework to jointly capture common-ownership and cross-ownership by rival …rms. 4 In fact, as we show below, property (v ) may -in certain cases -also fail under the dominant formulation. 5 This means that if a shareholder owns a portfolio that is equal to another shareholder's portfolio multiplied by , the manager will consider they both have the same relative returns. Their control rights will naturally be di¤erent, but their relative returns will be the same. This makes the smaller shareholder more relevant in the manager's objective function because in the dominant formulation, this shareholder would have smaller control rights and also smaller absolute returns. et al. (2018) who, to address property (vi), normalize shareholder k's returns by P h2= kh , but we microfound our function through a probabilistic voting model. This alternative formulation can satisfy the six desirable properties discussed above.
An Illustrative Example
We now address an illustrative example, borrowed from Gramlich and Grundl (2017) , to examine how the two formulations compare in terms of properties (i) to (vi). Imagine a duopoly in which one shareholder holds symmetric …nancial and voting rights in both …rms and each of the remaining shareholders holds equal …nancial and voting rights in solely one …rm. In this setting, properties (i) to (iv) clearly hold in both formulations. Online Appendix A examines properties (v) and (vi), which we now discuss.
If we combine O&S's formulation with an assumption of proportional control, property (v) holds. The weight that managers assign to rival …rm pro…ts increases when the relative size of the horizontal shareholder stakes increase (due to either higher levels of horizontal shareholding or higher number of non-horizontal shareholders). However, this combination also predicts that managers would engage in near-monopoly pricing when the non-horizontal shareholders are highly dispersed, even if the horizontal shareholder does not have full control, which fails property (vi). Likewise, if we combine O&S's formulation with an assumption of Banzhaf control, property (v) holds for increasing levels of horizontal shareholding with a constant number of shareholders, but may or may not hold for a constant level of horizontal shareholding with an increasing number of shareholders, since the number of subsets in which the horizontal shareholder is pivotal can decrease as the number of non-horizontal shareholders increase. However, again, property (vi) does not hold. Table 1 , Panel A illustrates these features.
If we combine our proposed alternative formulation with an assumption of proportional control, property (v) holds for increasing levels of horizontal shareholding with a constant number of shareholders, but not for a constant level of horizontal shareholding with an increasing number of shareholders. The reason being that -in our example -the weight that the manager of each …rm assigns to the pro…t of the rival …rm is solely given by the control rights of the horizontal shareholder, since her …nancial rights in the two …rms exactly cancel. However, this combination does not predict that managers would engage in nearmonopoly pricing when the non-horizontal shareholders are highly dispersed, even if the horizontal shareholder does not have full control. It thus satis…es property (vi). Likewise, if we combine our formulation with an assumption of Banzhaf control, property (v) holds for increasing levels of horizontal shareholding with a constant number of shareholders, but may or may not hold for a constant level of horizontal shareholding with an increasing number of shareholders (for the same reasons as discussed above). However, property (vi) holds. Table   1 , Panel B illustrates these features.
The Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework is based in Azar (2016 Azar ( , 2017 and Brito et al. (2018) . There are K shareholders, indexed by k 2 and N …rms, indexed by j 2 =. The holdings of total stock of shareholder k in …rm j, represented by 0 kj 1 with P k2 kj = 1, capture her …nancial rights to the …rm's stream of pro…ts. The holdings of voting stock of shareholder k in …rm j, represented by 0 kj 1 with P k2 kj = 1, capture her voting rights in the …rm that may not coincide with her control rights in the …rm, which refer to the rights to in ‡uence the …rm's decisions in a way discussed below.
We follow Azar (2016 Azar ( , 2017 in assuming a standard theory of probabilistic voting. We also assume, along Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) , that the manager of each …rm is the winner in an election between two candidates, an incumbent and a challenger, who compete for the shareholders' votes by proposing a strategy for the …rm. Shareholders and candidates are assumed to play a two-stage game. First, candidates simultaneously choose their strategy proposals (e.g., quantity, price, etc.). Second, shareholders vote to elect their managers.
We assume the following regarding the voting behavior of shareholders:
Assumption 1 Shareholders are conditionally sincere.
Assumption 1 implies, following Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) , that …rm j's shareholders vote for the candidate whose strategy proposal maximizes their utilities, given the equilibrium strategy proposals of the candidates to the remaining …rms, randomizing between them when indi¤erent.
We consider that the utility of shareholder k is a function of the winning strategies of all …rms and involves two elements, assumed additively separable, as follows:
The …rst utility element follows from O&S and captures the utility associated to the return of shareholder k's …nancial rights holdings. The second utility element follows from Kramer (1983) and captures the utility associated to the credibility (or lack of credibility) attached to the challenger' strategy proposal, where d g denotes a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the challenger is elected manager of …rm g and kg denotes the utility that shareholder 
Banzhaf Control 0.000 0.986 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 k obtains from such event. This implies that the shareholder's choice is deterministic and it is a discontinuous function of the di¤erence in the utilities obtained from the strategy proposals of each candidate. We follow Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) in assuming that the utility associated to the credibility of the challenger'strategy proposal, while known to voters, is unobserved by candidates, which treat it as a random utility shock independently distributed across …rms and shareholders according to a symmetric probability distribution with mean zero and cumulative distribution G kj ( ). 6 Thus, from the candidates'perspective, voting by shareholders is probabilistic.
We make the following alternative assumptions regarding the candidates objective function.
Assumption 2a Candidates choose strategy proposals to maximize their expected utility from corporate o¢ ce.
Assumption 2b Candidates choose strategy proposals to maximize their vote share.
Additionally, we make the following technical assumptions:
Assumption 3 The strategy space of each …rm j is a nonempty compact subset of <.
Assumption 4 The return of shareholder k is (a) continuous and twice di¤erentiable in the …rms'strategies, with continuous second derivatives; and (b) strictly concave in …rm j's strategy, conditional on the strategies of the remaining …rms.
Assumption 5 The random utility kj is distributed uniformly on 1 2 j kj ; 1 2 j kj .
The key, distinctive, technical assumption is Assumption 5. It implies that managers expect that shareholders with higher …nancial stakes in the …rm will take more interest on their actions and could therefore potentially have a larger preference towards or against the challenger than other shareholders. This is consistent with a signi…cant literature that has examined the incentives of large shareholders to undertake costly monitoring of the …rm and intervene to correct the manager's suboptimal decisions (see, e.g., Chidambaran and John, 2003 , and references therein). Finally, it implies also that the utility associated to a …rm in which a shareholder does not hold …nancial stakes is null.
The following Proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1, 2a or 2b, 3, 4 and 5, there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the candidates strategy proposals'game where each candidate maximizes
Under Assumption 2a; kj is measured by the normalized Banzhaf ( 1965) power index of shareholder k in …rm j: kj = p jk = P h2 p jh , where p jk denotes the number of subsets of shareholders that can award victory to a candidate in which shareholder k is pivotal. Under assumption 2b, kj is measured by the voting rights of shareholder k in …rm j: kj = kj .
Proof. See online appendix B.
Proposition 1 establishes that the manager decides the strategy of the …rm to maximize a weighted sum of the …rm's shareholders relative returns. The weights kj (that are nonnegative and sum up to one) capture the importance (or in ‡uence) of each shareholder over the decision-making of the …rm and are a measure of her control in the …rm. This implies the manager maximizes a weighted sum of the pro…ts of (potentially) all …rms, P g2= l jg g , where the weights l jg = P k2 j kj ( kg = kj ) are non-negative. 7
Conclusions
We propose an alternative formulation to model the objective function of the manager of a …rm in the presence of horizontal shareholding. In this alternative formulation, the manager decides the strategy of the …rm by maximizing a weighted sum of the …rm's shareholders relative returns. We do not claim it to be preferred to O&S's formulation. We solely propose it as microfounded alternative which avoids an allegedly unattractive feature of the O&S's formulation: that if non-horizontal shareholders are highly dispersed, managers would mimic the interests of horizontal shareholders even if they own a share of the …rm that does not induce full control. Future empirical testing might help establish which formulation more accurately predicts …rm behavior. This alternative formulation can be straightforwardly incorporated into the generalized unilateral e¤ects screens proposed in Brito et al. (2018). 7 With cross-ownership among …rms, the corresponding weights would be l jg = P k2 j u kj ( u kg = u kj ), where u kj and u kj denote the ultimate …nancial and control rights, respectively, of external shareholder k in …rm j, which can be computed following the algorithm in Brito et al. (2018) . of the remaining n > (1 x)=x smaller shareholders holds equal …nancial and voting rights in solely one …rm. Let l denote the Banzhaf power index of the horizontal shareholder and s = (1 l )=n denote the Banzhaf power index of each of the remaining non-horizontal shareholders.
The Banzhaf power index of the horizontal shareholder l is obtained as follows. Consider initially those subsets of shareholders that aggregate more than 50% of the voting rights and that do not include the horizontal shareholder. Each subset must include z smaller non-horizontal shareholders such that z 1 x n > 1 2 which is equivalent to z j n 2(1 x) k +1, where byc denotes the largest integer lower than y. Any single smaller non-horizontal shareholder is pivotal in one of these subsets if (z 1) 1 x n < 1 2 which is equivalent to z j n 2(1 x) + 1 k . 8 Therefore, any small non-horizontal shareholder is pivotal in all subsets of z = j n 2(1 x) + 1 k small shareholders in which she is present. There are C n z = n! (n z)!z! di¤erent subsets with z smaller non-horizontal shareholders. Therefore, the number of subsets that do not include the horizontal shareholder in which any small non-horizontal shareholder
Consider now those subsets of shareholders that aggregate more than 50% of the voting rights and that include the horizontal shareholder. Each subset must include z smaller non-horizontal shareholders such that z 1 x n + x > 1 2 which is equivalent to z j
( 1 2 x) n 1 x k + 1: Any single smaller non-horizontal shareholder is pivotal in one of these subsets if (z 1) 1 x n + x < 1 2 which is equivalent to z j 1 2
x n 1 x + 1 k . Therefore, any small shareholder is pivotal in all subsets that include the horizontal shareholder and z = j 1 2
x n 1 x + 1 k small shareholders in which she is present. The number of subsets that include the horizontal shareholder in which any small non-horizontal shareholder is pivotal is C n 1
. In turn, the horizontal shareholder is pivotal in those subsets that include her and z small non-horizontal shareholders if z 1 x n < 1 2 which is equivalent to z
. Therefore, the horizontal shareholder is pivotal in all subsets that include her and z small non-horizontal shareholders, with:
(
which implies the number of sets in which the horizontal shareholder is pivotal is:
Using the information above, by de…nition, the Banzhaf power index of the horizontal shareholder is:
Next, we discuss properties (v ) and (vi ) under the two formulations. To do so, we make use of the weight that each manager assigns to the pro…t of the rival …rm. It is straightforward to show that this weight is given by the expressions presented in Table A1 . 8 P le a se se e O n lin e A p p e n d ix B fo r th e fo rm a l d e …n itio n o f p ivo ta l.
Table A1
Weight that each Manager Assigns to the Pro…t of the Rival Firm
O&S's Proposed Alternative Formulation Formulation
Proportional Control
In this setting, the relative size of the horizontal shareholder depends both on its absolute size and on the number of smaller non-horizontal shareholders. In order to examine the impact of the relative size of the horizontal shareholder on the weight that each manager assigns to the pro…t of the rival …rm, we examine how this weight is impacted by x and n, since that relative size increases in x and n.
We begin by examining O&S's formulation. Under proportional control, the weight that each manager assigns to the pro…t of the rival …rm is given by wpc =
x 2
x 2 +(1 x) 2 =n , which increases in x and n:
This implies that property (v ) is present both if the number of shareholders is …xed and if it is allowed to vary.
Under Banzhaf control, the weight that each manager assigns to the pro…t of the rival …rm is given by w bc = l x l x+(1 l )(1 x)=n , which increases in x and n if:
dw bc dn = @w bc @n + @w bc @ l @ l @n > 0:
As:
we need to evaluate the sign of @ l @x and @ l @n in order to evaluate the above conditions. We begin by the latter. It is possible to show with examples that @ l @n can take any sign. Consider, for example, the case with x = 0:05. When n increases from 499 to 500, l increases 0:016 whereas when n increases from 500 to 501, l decreases 0:016. This implies that property (v ) may or may not be present if the number of shareholders is allowed to vary, depending on the number of shareholders and the corresponding subsets in which each shareholder is pivotal. We now address the former. As @((1=2 x)n=(1 x)) @x = n 2(1 x) 2 < 0 and @(n=2(1 x)) @x = n 2(1 x) 2 > 0, the number of terms in the summation term that determines the number of subsets in which the horizontal shareholder is pivotal cannot decrease with x. We now consider the e¤ect of x in the number of subsets in which any small shareholder is pivotal, starting with C n 1 j
( 1 2 x) n decreases. As (n 1)=2 (1=2 x)n (1 x) = x(n+1) 1 2(1 x) > 0 for all x (otherwise, the horizontal shareholder is smaller than the others), we can conclude that increasing x may maintain or decrease
. We now turn to C n 1 n 2(1 x)
. As (n 1) 2 n 2(1 x) = nx+1 x 2(1 x) < 0 for all x, increasing x may maintain or increase
which never increases
k . This implies that increases in x cannot lead to a decrease in the Banzhaf power index and, hence, cannot decrease w bc . This implies that property (v ) is present if the number of shareholders of a …rm is …xed.
We now examine the proposed alternative formulation. Under proportional control, the weight that each manager assigns to the pro…t of the rival …rm is given by x, which increases in x and does not vary in n. This implies that property (v ) is present if the number of shareholders is …xed while it is not present if the number of shareholders is allowed to vary. Under Banzhaf control, the weight that each manager assigns to the pro…t of the rival …rm is given by l . As discussed in the O&S's formulation section above, this may decrease with n but never decreases with x. This implies that property (v ) is present if the number of shareholders is …xed while it may be present or not if the number of shareholders is allowed to vary, depending on the number of shareholders and the corresponding subsets in which each shareholder is pivotal.
Property (vi ).
Under proportional control, the di¤erence in weights that each manager assigns to the pro…t of the rival …rm between O&S's formulation and our proposed alternative formulation is given by:
As x 2 (n + 1) 2x + 1 > x 2 2x + 1 = (1 x) 2 > 0 this is always positive, meaning the weights that each manager assigns to the pro…t of the rival …rm are lower under the proposed alternative formulation than under O&S's formulation. Moreover, the weight that each manager assigns to the pro…t of the rival …rm under O&S's formulation tends to one, for any given value of the horizontal shareholder's control rights x, as n ! 1. In contrast, the weight that each manager assigns to the pro…t of the rival …rm under the proposed alternative formulation, solely tends to one when x tends to one.
Under Banzhaf control, the di¤erence in weights that each manager assigns to the pro…t of the rival …rm between O&S's formulation and our proposed alternative formulation is given by:
which is always positive, meaning the weights that each manager assigns to the pro…t of the rival …rm are lower under the proposed alternative formulation than under O&S's formulation. Moreover, the weight that each manager assigns to the pro…t of the rival …rm under O&S's formulation tends to one, for any given value of the horizontal shareholder's control rights l , as n ! 1. In contrast, the weight that each manager assigns to the pro…t of the rival …rm under the proposed alternative formulation, solely tends to one when l tends to one.
Online Appendix B
In this appendix, we present the proof of Proposition 1. We divide it in two. We …rst present the proof under Assumptions 1, 2a, 3, 4 and 5. We then present the proof under Assumptions 1, 2b, 3, 4 and 5. To do so, let x aj and x bj denote the strategy proposals of the incumbent and the challenger for …rm j, respectively and let x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x j ; : : : ; x N ) > denote the N 1 vector of strategy proposals for all the …rms in the industry. Further, let m j 2 fa j ; b j g denote the identity of the candidate that receives the majority of …rm j's voting rights (being elected manager of the …rm) and let m = (m 1 ; : : : ; m j ; : : : ; m N ) > denote the N 1 vector of elected managers for all the …rms in the industry. Finally, let u k (x; m) and R k (x) express the mathematical dependence of the utility and return of shareholder k, respectively, on the winning strategies of all …rms.
Proof of Proposition 1 under Assumptions 1, 2a, 3, 4 and 5.
Assumption 2a implies that candidates choose strategy proposals so to maximize the product of the probability that they are elected in the second stage and the utility obtained from the rent associated with corporate o¢ ce they expect to accrue conditional upon being elected, which we denote . Since the maximization problem of the two candidates to …rm j is symmetric, we describe -for simplicity of exposition -solely the incumbent's problem, who chooses x aj so to solve:
where xa = (x 1 ; : : : ; x aj ; : : : ; x N ) > , x b = x 1 ; : : : ; x bj ; : : : ; x N > and Pr (m j = a j jxa; x b ) denotes the probability with which the incumbent is, from the candidates perspective, elected manager of the …rm in the second stage.
In order to solve the above maximization problem, we must beforehand derive Pr (m j = a j jxa; x b ). To do so, let`j denote the number of shareholders with voting rights in …rm j, } j denote all the 2`j 1 possible subsets of those shareholders that can award the majority of votes to a candidate and { j 2 } j denote a particular subset of those shareholders. Given that the incumbent's election is ensured with the votes of all shareholders in each subset in } j , we have that the probability Pr (m j = a j jxa; x b ) with which she is elected manager of …rm j just sums the probabilities Pr m j = a j jxa; x b ; { j with which she is elected in each subset { j , as follows:
where ma = (m 1 ; : : : ; a j ; : : : ; m N ) > and m b = (m 1 ; : : : ; b j ; : : : ; m N ) > while Pr ka j (xa; ma; x b ; m b ) and Pr kb j (xa; ma; x b ; m b ) = 1 Pr ka j (xa; ma; x b ; m b ) denote the probability that shareholder k votes for the incumbent and the challenger, respectively.
It remains to derive Pr ka j (xa; ma; x b ; m b ), which is given by:
where the second equality makes use of the fact that the term P g2=nj dg kg enters the utility obtained from both strategy proposals and the last equality makes use of Assumption 5. This implies that we can rewrite the incumbent's problem as follows:
Assumptions 1, 3, 4 and 5 imply that this problem is strictly concave conditional on rival …rm strategies and therefore has a unique maximum. In order to see why note that, under Assumption 1, shareholders are conditionally sincere, which implies that the incumbent candidate to …rm j can choose her strategy proposal taking the strategies of the candidates to the remaining …rms as given. The …rst order condition of this problem is, thus, given by:
where, using probability (13), we have that:
which (i ) is, by de…nition, non-negative since increasing Pr ka j (xa; ma; x b ; m b ) for any k can not have a negative impact on Pr (m j = a j jxa; x b ); and (ii ) does not depend on Pr ka j (xa; ma;
for any k taking the corresponding probabilities of the remaining shareholders as given. The second order condition of the incumbent's problem, in turn, is given by:
where the last equality makes use of the fact that @ 2 Pr (m j = a j jxa; x b ) =@ Pr ka j (xa; ma; x b ; m b ) 2 = 0 for all k, since it does not depend on Pr ka j (xa; ma; x b ; m b ). Using probability (13), we have that the objective function of the manager is strictly concave in x aj , conditional on the strategies of the remaining …rms, since (i ) @ 2 Pr ka j (xa; ma;
aj is negative under Assumption 4; and (ii ) @ Pr (m j = a j jxa; x b ) =@ Pr ka j (xa; ma; x b ; m b ) > 0 for at least an shareholder k. Finally, given that the strategy proposal x aj is, under Assumption 3, de…ned in a convex set, we have that the incumbent's maximization problem has an unique maximum.
Given the symmetry of the maximization problem of the challenger candidate to …rm j, we have that the two candidates will choose the same best-response function, i.e., the same strategy proposal for the …rm, conditional on the strategies of the candidates to the remaining …rms. We now show that this best-response function is the same as the best-response function that arises while maximizing a weighted average of the relative returns of the …rm's shareholders conditional on the strategies of the candidates to the remaining …rms, with normalized Banzhaf power indices as weights. To do so, note that since the two candidates will choose the same best-response function, in equilibrium, we have R k (xa) = R k (x b ) = R k (x) for all k. This implies that the …rst-order condition reduces to:
which makes use of the fact that @ Pr ka j (xa; ma; x b ; m b ) =@x aj = 1= j kj @R k (xa) =@x aj and Pr ka j (xa; ma; x b ; m b ) = Pr kb j (xa; ma; x b ; m b ) = 1=2 when xa = x b , both for all k. This …rst-order condition can, in turn, be rewritten as:
where jk denotes the number of subsets in } j in which shareholder k enters and 2`j 1 jk denotes the number of subsets in } j in which shareholder k does not enter. Finally, consider that jk can be divided in two terms: the number of subsets in } j in which shareholder k enters and is pivotal, p jk , and the number of subsets in } j in which shareholder k enters and is not pivotal, p jk . 9 The latter is, by construction, equal to the number of subsets in } j in which shareholder k does not enter. This implies that p jk = 2`j 1 jk and that the …rst-order condition can be rewritten as:
where p jk =2`j 1 denotes the Banzhaf power index associated to shareholder k in …rm j. This establishes that, in equilibrium, the candidates to each …rm converge to the same strategy, which also maximizes the following weighted average of the relative returns of the shareholders with voting rights in the …rm, conditional on the strategies of the candidates to the remaining …rms:
where kj = p jk =2`j 1 = P k2 p jk =2`j 1 = p jk = P k2 p jk denotes the weight assigned by …rm j's manager to the return of shareholder k, measured by the normalized Banzhaf power index of shareholder k in …rm j.
Finally, given that the strategy proposal of each candidate to the di¤erent …rms is, under Assumption 3, de…ned in a convex set and R k (x) is, under Assumption 4, continuous, the best-response functions of the candidates to the di¤erent …rms are guaranteed to be upper-hemicontinuous, which implies that we can apply Kakutani's …xed point theorem to ensure that the Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof of Proposition 1 under Assumptions 1, 2b, 3, 4 and 5.
Assumption 2b implies that candidates choose strategy proposals so to maximize the sum, across all shareholders, of the product of the probability that each shareholder votes for the candidate by the corresponding voting rights. Again, since the maximization problem of the two candidates to …rm j is symmetric, we describe -for simplicity of exposition -solely the incumbent's problem, who chooses x aj so to solve:
where, under Assumption 5, Pr ka j (xa; ma; x b ; m b ) = (1=2) + 1= j kj (R k (xa) R k (x b )) denotes, as discussed above, the probability that shareholder k votes for the incumbent.
whereas the second order condition is given by:
which implies, given Assumption 4, that the objective function of the manager is strictly concave in x aj , conditional on the strategies of the remaining …rms. Finally, given that the strategy proposal x aj is, under Assumption 3, de…ned in a convex set, we have that the incumbent's maximization problem has an unique maximum.
Given the symmetry of the maximization problem of the challenger candidate to …rm j, we have that the two candidates will choose the same best-response function, i.e., the same strategy proposal for the …rm, conditional on the strategies of the candidates to the remaining …rms. This establishes that, in equilibrium, the candidates to each …rm converge to the same strategy, which also maximizes the following weighted average of the relative returns of the shareholders with voting rights in the …rm, conditional on the strategies of the candidates to the remaining …rms:
where kj = kj denotes the weight assigned by …rm j's manager to the return of shareholder k, measured by the voting rights of shareholder k in …rm j.
